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cability of the third party consent rule to such situations, more-
over, would jeopardize a co-occupant's reasonable expectation of
privacy. It is unrealistic to presume that a defendant assumed the
risk that a person whose use of the premises was circumscribed
could consent to a warrantless search.2 Indeed, it appears that
the application of the third party consent rule beyond the limits
set forth in Cosme would undercut a defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights based on his granting even a modicum of access or
control of his premises to another and would subvert the judicial
policy favoring use of search warrants a.27  It is suggested, therefore,
that use of the third party consent rule be limited to situations
where the consenting party enjoys "unfettered access to and con-
trol over" the premises searched.
Peter McNamara
Use of defendant's silence at time of arrest for impeachment vio-
lates due process, despite absence of Miranda warnings
It is well established in New York that a defendant's silence
upon arrest may not be used by the prosecution in a criminal trial
premises cannot be subjected to a warrantless search of those premises based on the consent
of a third party. 31 N.Y.2d at 976, 293 N.E.2d at 559-60, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 311. Thus, it can
be concluded that a third party's consent would not validate a warrantless search of an area
used exclusively by a co-occupant.
It also appears that the consent of a third party would be invalid where the third party
has less access and control than the nonconsenting individual. See Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner, a warrantless search of a hotel room was performed with the
consent of the management in the absence of the occupant. Id. at 484-85. While acknowl-
edging that the defendant impliedly shared control of the room with the hotel management,
the Court held that the degree of control possessed by the hotel management was not suffi-
cient to authorize consent to a police search. Id. at 488-90. It is logical to assume, therefore,
that if a third party with less control cannot validly consent to a search in the absence of
the occupant, he cannot do so in the presence of the occupant.
27' The doctrine of assumption of risk is based on the theory that the defendant volun-
tarily has chosen to encounter a risk that is both recognized and appreciated. See Bacigal,
Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 529, 541 (1978). As applied to third party consent situations, it has been reasoned
that a willingness to share one's possession, use or control of property implies an assumption
of the risk that the joint user might allow a police search of the property. Id. at 548. See
also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740
(1969).
28 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948);
United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Prescott, 599
F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1979); People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 697, 339 N.E.2d 182, 186,
376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 502 (1975); 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1, at 3 (1978).
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as evidence of guilt. 7 9 The use of prior silence for impeachment
purposes, on the other hand, has been permitted where the defen-
dant's failure to speak in the face of accusation was "patently in-
consistent" with his exculpatory testimony at trial.28 0 Recently,
however, in People v. Conyers,5 1 the Court of Appeals held that
the credibility of a defendant's exculpatory trial testimony may
not be impeached by proof of his silence at the time of arrest, re-
2, See People v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 430, 244 N.E.2d 703, 704, 297 N.Y.S.2d
134, 135 (1969); People v. Bianculli, 9 N.Y.2d 468, 174 N.E.2d 717, 715 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961);
People v. Peterson, 4 N.Y.2d 992, 993, 152 N.E.2d 532, 532, 177 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (1958)
(per curiam). In People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933), the Court of Ap-
peals established the principle that since an arrestee is under no obligation to contradict
accusatory statements made in his presence, his silence while in custodial detention cannot
be used as an implied admission of guilt. Id. at 105, 184 N.E. at 690. The Court stated:
[N]o cautious person, when in custody, accused of crime would care to enter into a
discussion of his guilt or innocence with his captors and co-defendants, when what
he said might be used against him .... He is then under no duty to speak and
his silence should not be counted as giving assent to what he hears. If he had
counsel, he would doubtless be advised not to talk. If he had not, he should not be
prejudiced thereby.
Id. at 107, 184 N.E. at 690. Similarly, the federal courts have uniformly held that the use of
silence upon arrest as substantive evidence of guilt is impermissible. See, e.g., United States
v. Faulkenberry, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v.
Nolan, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); United States v. Nielsen,
392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
180 See People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 360, 320 N.E.2d 639, 641-42, 361 N.Y.S.2d
901, 905 (1974). Compare United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973), and United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 569 (1971), with Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). Prior to Rothschild, the rule in New York appeared to be that a
defendant's silence while in police custody could not be used against him at trial for any
purpose. People v. Musolini, 54 App. Div. 2d 22, 386 N.Y.S.2d 710 (3d Dep't 1976). In
Rothschild, however, a police officer was arrested in the act of accepting a bribe. Although
he remained silent at the time of his arrest, the defendant testified at trial that he had
agreed to accept money from the complainant in order to set the defendant up for a later
arrest on bribery charges. 35 N.Y.2d at 359, 320 N.E.2d at 641, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The
prosecutor was permitted to impeach the defendant's credibility by cross-examining him
about his failure to inform any superior officer of this plan either before or after his arrest.
Id. at 360, 320 N.E.2d at 641-42, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The Court held that the defendant's
prior silence was a proper subject of cross-examination since it was "patently inconsistent"
with his trial testimony and, as a police officer, he had a "patent obligation to speak." Id.
Post-Rothschild decisions have generally confined the impeachment use of postarrest silence
to cases involving law enforcement officers, see People v. Bowen, 65 App. Div. 2d 364, 368-
69, 411 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (1st Dep't 1978) (off-duty housing authority patrolman), although
at least one lower court concluded that, under Rothschild, any criminal defendant may be
impeached by prior inconsistent silence, see People v. Matonti, 53 App. Div. 2d 1022, 385
N.Y.S.2d 922 (4th Dep't 1976) (dictum).
281 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1979), aff'g, 65 App. Div. 2d 437,
411 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1978).
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gardless of whether he had been advised of his right to remain
silent.8 2
Thomas Conyers was overtaken and arrested while fleeing the
scene of an alleged armed robbery.'" At the time of his arrest,
Conyers did not volunteer any information about the circum-
stances culminating in his apprehension 8 4 and maintained his si-
lence even though the police had not provided him with Miranda
warnings. 8 5 During his trial, however, the defendant took the
stand and offered an exculpatory version of the events leading to
his arrest.28 ' The prosecution was permitted, over a defense objec-
tion, to impeach Conyers' credibility by eliciting on cross-examina-
tion that he had failed to inform the police of his version of the
incident at the time of the arrest.287 The defendant subsequently
was convicted of armed robbery, attempted assault, and possession
of a dangerous weapon.28 The Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, reversed the conviction, holding that the use of Conyers' si-
lence while in police custody for impeachment purposes had de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial.8 e
A closely divided Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal and
directed a new trial, concluding that impeachment of a defendant's
testimony by silence at the time of arrest violated his right to due
process.290 Authoring the majority opinion, 91 Judge Gabrielli rea-
282 49 N.Y.2d at 180, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
28. Id. at 177, 400 N.E.2d at 345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The prosecution offered testi-
mony at trial that the defendant and his accomplice had forced the two complainants at
gunpoint into a nearby apartment building, and then bound and robbed them. Id. One com-
plainant freed himself and chased the two men until the police finally intervened and ar-
rested the suspects. Id.
28 Id. at 177, 400 N.E.2d at 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
288 Id. at 179, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that an arrested person must be warned prior to custo-
dial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him, that he has the right to counsel, and that, if he so desires, an attorney will be
appointed for him prior to questioning if he cannot afford counsel. Id. at 479.
ss 49 N.Y.2d at 178, 400 N.E.2d at 345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The defendant testified
that he and his alleged accomplice had visited the complainant's apartment to collect a
gambling debt. When a scuffle ensued, Conyers purportedly took the complainant's gun and
left the building with his codefendant. While in pursuit, however, the complainant yelled to
police officers that he had been robbed. The defendants were then arrested. Id. at 192, 400
N.E.2d at 354, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 414 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
-7 Id. at 177, 400 N.E.2d at 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 404. The prosecutor also commented
on Conyrs' silence during her summation. Id.
288 Id. at 176, 400 N.E.2d at 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
28 65 App. Div. 2d at 442, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
288 49 N.Y.2d at 180, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07. Alternatively, the
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soned that the federal and state constitutional guarantees against
self-incrimination assure a defendant, at least implicitly, that his
silence upon arrest will not be used against him.29 2 Moreover, the
majority asserted, the right to remain silent exists independently
of the Miranda warnings.9 3 Judge Gabrielli concluded, therefore,
that it would be fundamentally unfair and a denial of due process
to permit the state to renege on its implied promise by using a
defendant's silence for impeachment purposes, even though the de-
fendant had not been formally apprised of his right to remain
Court held that the use of the defendant's postarrest silence for impeachment purposes was
violative of the fifth amendment Because the decision to remain silent in the custody of the
police is, in and of itself, an assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, id. at 182, 400 N.E.2d at 348, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 408, Judge Gabrielli concluded, to per-
mit that silence to be used against a defendant at his later trial would "place a burden upon
the direct exercise of a fundamental right." Id.; see People v. Dinkins, 69 App. Div. 2d 384,
418 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1st Dep't 1979); People v. Nolasco, 70 App. Div. 2d 549, 416 N.Y.S.2d 610
(1st Dep't 1979). Moreover, the majority reasoned, such a burden could not be justified by
the state's interest in preventing perjury, since postarrest silence is consistent with inno-
cence as well as guilt and, therefore, is only marginally probative of a defendant's credibil-
ity. 49 N.Y.2d at 181, 400 N.E.2d at 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
As noted by Judge Meyer in his dissent, the alternative holding of the Conyers majority
that impeachment by silence constitutes an impermissible burden on a defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, seems squarely inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent. See id. at 185, 400 N.E.2d at 349-50, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 410 (Meyer, J., dis-
senting). In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld the use
of a defendant's failure to take the stand at his first trial to impeach his exculpatory testi-
mony on retrial. Id. at 497. Expressly rejecting the contention that impeachment by prior
silence was an impermissible burden on a defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment
rights, the Raffel Court concluded: "We are unable to see that the rule that [a defendant
who] testifies . . . must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable
embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify
or not." Id. at 499. The Raffel rule recently was reaffirmed in Jenkins v. Anderson, 48
U.S.L.W. 4693 (U.S. June 10, 1980), wherein the Supreme Court held that a defendant who
elects to take the stand at trial waives any fifth amendment objection to the use of his pre-
arrest silence for impeachment purposes. See id. at 4694-95.
291 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg joined Judge Gabrielli in
the majority. Judge Meyer authored a dissent in which Judges Jasen and Jones concurred.
292 49 N.Y.2d at 179, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
293 Id. The majority concluded that the Miranda warnings do not create the right to
remain silent, but merely serve to ensure that an accused fully understands his rights. Id.
Judge Gabrielli argued, moreover, that the absence of Miranda warnings does not preclude
the possibility 'that an arrested suspect will knowingly rely on his privilege against self-
incrimination since "it is a matter of common knowledge that a person who is arrested is not
required to speak to the police, and that his silence may not be used against him." Id. at
180, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406. To conclude otherwise, the majority urged,
would in effect "reward" improper police procedure by allowing the failure to administer
Miranda warnings to serve as a foundation for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence.
Id. at 179, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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silent. 94
Dissenting, Judge Meyer urged that the ability of the prosecu-
tion to impeach a defendant by his silence at the time of arrest
should depend "on a balancing of the prejudice to the defendant
on the one hand and the probativeness of his silence as a measure
of credibility on the other." 29 15 Judge Meyer argued that since the
police had failed to advise Conyers of his right to remain silent, no
governmental action had induced his failure to speak and, there-
fore, there was no state action upon which to predicate a due pro-
cess claim.296 Furthermore, the dissent asserted that by electing to
testify at trial, the defendant was susceptible to impeachment by
29 Id. at 179-80, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406. The majority asserted that
Conyers presented a constitutionally indistinguishable situation from that involved in Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court held that the use for impeachment
purposes of a defendant's silence at the time of arrest and following Miranda warnings vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 619. In Doyle, the defen-
dant was given Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest for selling marijuana. At that
time, he made no statements to the police. At trial, however, he took the stand on his own
behalf and testified that he had been "framed." Id. at 613. On cross-examination, the prose-
cution sought to impeach the defendant's exculpatory testimony by demonstrating that he
had remained silent after arrest. Id. at 619-20. The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier
decision in Miranda, see id., reversed the conviction:
[Wihile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that
silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives
the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a dep-
rivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered at trial.
Id. at 618.
The Court of Appeals distinguished Rothschild, see note 280 and accompanying text
supra, as an "unusual" case in which the defendant's failure to protest his innocence upon
arrest was so "extraordinarily probative" that use of his silence for purposes of impeach-
ment was permissible. 49 N.Y.2d at 178, 181, 400 N.E.2d at 345, 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 405,
407.
29. 49 N.Y.2d at 184, 400 N.E.2d at 349, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
The dissent limited its proposed standard to silence at or before the time of arrest, as op-
posed to silence after arrest. Id. at 184 n.2, 400 N.E.2d at 349 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 409 n.2
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 185-87, 400 N.E.2d at 350-51, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 410-11 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Judge Meyer cited the remark of Justice Stevens in Doyle that "if no [Miranda] warning
had been given,. . . nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that there would be any unfair-
ness in using petitioners' prior inconsistent silence for impeachment purposes." Id. at 185,
400 N.E.2d at 350, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 410 (citing 426 U.S. at 625-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Furthermore, since the Conyers dissent approved the impeachment use of silence occurring
at or before the time of arrest rather than while in actual police custody, see note 295 supra,
Judge Meyer concluded that the custodial interrogation that triggers the right to remain
silent and the Miranda obligation would not have begun. 49 N.Y.2d at 186, 400 N.E.2d at
350, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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any reasonably probative means.9 Since the defendant's failure to
protest his innocence at the time of his arrest was "unnatural,"29 8
Judge Meyer concluded that Conyers' prior silence was sufficiently
probative to be a proper subject of cross-examination. 29
It is suggested that the Conyers Court was correct in finding a
due process deficiency in the use for impeachment purposes of a
defendant's silence while in custodial detention.300 Because an ar-
restee's silence may be "as consistent with innocence as guilt,"30 1
impeachment by silence at the time of arrest may be constitution-
ally defective simply because silence is not probative of a defen-
dant's credibility.302 Moreover, any probative value that it does
have may be outweighed by the danger that the jury will improp-
erly construe it as evidence of guilt 0 s since postarrest silence is
normally used to impeach alibi testimony or other defenses going
to the crux of the guilt issueY-' It appears, therefore, that the
Conyers rule will have the creditable effect of ensuring that crimi-
nal defendants will be convicted only upon evidence that is proba-
207 49 N.Y.2d at 187-89, 400 N.E.2d at 351-52, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12. (Meyer, J., dis-
senting). The dissent contended that Conyers had waived any fifth amendment objection to
the impeachment use of his prior silence by taking the stand in his own defense. Id. at 187-
88, 400 N.E.2d at 351-52, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 191-93 & n.8, 400 N.E.2d at 354-55 & n.8, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15 & n.8
(Meyer, J., dissenting). According to Judge Meyer, the inconsistency between the defend-
ant's silence upon arrest and his exculpatory testimony at trial was underscored by the fact
that "we deal here not with one claiming simply innocence but with a person who claims to
have been the victim of crime." Id. at 193 n.8, 400 N.E.2d at 355 n.8, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 415
n.8 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
299 Id. at 191-93 & n.8, 400 N.E.2d at 354-55 & n.8, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15 & n.8
(Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissent urged that a defendant's "human instinct" to extricate
himself from an incriminating situation was at least as compelling as the duty of a police
officer to speak. Id. at 193, 400 N.E.2d at 355, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Meyer, J., dissenting);
see note 280 supra.
200 A majority of state appellate courts addressing the issue of impeachment by postar-
rest silence have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 110 Ariz. 238,
517 P.2d 508 (1973); Hines v. People, 497 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1972); Darnell v. Commonwealth,
558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977); People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973). But see
People v. Queen, 8 Ill. App. 3d 858, 290 N.E.2d 631 (1972); Thomas v. State, 285 So.2d 148
(Miss. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
201 49 N.Y.2d at 182, 400 N.E.2d at 348, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
302 Cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1975); Stewart v. United States, 366
U.S. 1, 5 (1961); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957) (all decided on non-
constitutional grounds).
203 Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Si-
lence, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940, 973-74 (1975).
204 Id.; see, e.g., People v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 433, 244 N.E.2d 703, 704, 297
N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (1969) (per curiam); People v. Smoot, 59 App. Div. 2d 898, 899, 399
N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (2d Dep't 1977).
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tive of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is submitted, however, that the Court of Appeals has left
unresolved whether Conyers imposes a per se constitutional prohi-
bition against the impeachment use of postarrest silence or
whether, as an evidentiary matter, such use may sometimes be per-
missible. Because the Court failed to clearly distinguish its earlier
holding in People v. Rothschilds5" permitting impeachment by si-
lence where the defendant's failure to speak was "extraordinarily
probative," 0 6 it appears that New York courts may avoid the
Conyers safeguards by undertaking a case-by-case inquiry into the
probative value of a defendant's silence upon arrest. It is hoped,
therefore, that the Court will clarify the scope of its holding in
Conyers to guarantee its application in all instances.507
Lois Peel Eisenstein
303 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974).
8 Id. at 360, 320 N.E.2d at 341-42, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 905; see notes 280 & 294 supra.
307 Since its decision in Conyers, the Court of Appeals has addressed the question
whether a defendant may be cross-examined about his failure to include exculpatory infor-
mation in a statement made to police at the time of his arrest. In People v. Savage, 50
N.Y.2d 673, 409 N.E.2d 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1980), a majority of the Court, without men-
tioning Conyers, concluded that "when given circumstances make it most unnatural to omit
certain information from a statement," id. at 679, 409 N.E.2d at 861, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 384,
the omission is "extraordinarily probative" and admissible for purposes of impeachment. Id.
at 679, 409 N.E.2d at 861, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 385. While one concurring judge determined that
"the majority's studied silence on the matter" overruled Conyers, id. at 682, 409 N.E.2d at
863, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (Cooke, C. J., concurring), it seems more likely that the Savage
Court merely perceived the cases as presenting different issues; while Conyers involved the
use of constitutionally protected postarrest silence, Savage involved omissions from a state-
ment made once the privilege against self-incrimination had been voluntarily waived. Id.
(Cooke, C.J., concurring); see United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1286 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Cordova, 421 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 941 (1970);
People v. Dinkins, 69 App. Div. 2d 384, 399, 418 N.Y.S.2d 627, 637 (1st Dep't 1979)
(Silverman, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Briddle, 443 F.2d 443, 448 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971) (when defendant maintains silence at first, but later makes
statement, silence can be used against him).
In view of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124
(1980), it appears that, under the facts of Conyers, impeachment by silence may not violate
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. See People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d at 684
n.1, 409 N.E.2d at 861 n.1, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 385 n.1 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). In Jenkins, the
Supreme Court held that impeachment by pre-arrest silence did not violate the fourteenth
amendment since the defendant had not been given Miranda warnings or otherwise indi-
cated that he was relying on his right to remain silent. 100 S. Ct. at 2130. Reviewing its prior
holding in Doyle, the Jenkins Court reasoned that "Miranda warnings inform a person that
he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his subsequent
decision to remain silent cannot be used against him." Id. at 4696. Absent such an induce-
ment by the state to remain silent, however, "the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle
is not present ... " Id. See also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (where trial
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court mistakenly informed defendant that he could claim privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, "[e]lementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on that score"
and prosecutor may not comment on defendant's failure to speak).
It remains unclear whether the impeachment use of silence under the facts of Conyers
violates the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, the Jenkins decision would not vitiate the
holding of the Conyers majority on state constitutional grounds. See Jenkins v. Anderson,
100 S. Ct. at 2130; People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d at 684 n.1, 409 N.E.2d at 861 n.1, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 385 n.1 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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